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THE CHALLENGE OF GAULT IN ILLINOIS
The first Juvenile Court Act' in the United States was signed
into law in the State of Illinois on April 21, 1899,2 and it was not
long before similar courts were created in every state in the
Union. 3 The court, as conceived, was a new institution different
in purpose from any prior court.
With its jurisdiction defined by the- age of the offender (varying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction), it was intended to substitute
rehabilitation for punishment. Instead of responding automatically
to the offender's misdeeds, the court was to recognize them as
symptoms of a basic disorder and to help the child learn
how to
4
live in society without coming into conflict with the law.
Judge Julian Mack stated in 1909:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this
boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how has
he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest
and in 5the interest of the state to save him from a downward
career.
To achieve these ends, it was generally recognized that formal
proceedings should be kept to a minimum in order that a personal
relationship might exist between the judge and the child.
Parens Patriae
Underlying the justification for informal proceedings was the
historic doctrine of parens patriae. The origins of this doctrine
are derived from the practice of the English courts of chancery
in protecting persons having no other rightful protector. 6 The
chancellor, by the prerogative of the Crown, was the protector of
the estate and person of an infant.7 This power, historically
vested in the English monarch, has been adopted by the several
state sovereigns and by the federal sovereign, as exercised in the
8
District of Columbia and United States territories.
The power of the state acting in parens patriae is manifest
in many areas of the law. The state, for example, may act to
protect the insane by an adjudication of incompetency and appointment of a custodian.9 The incompetent may be committed
1Laws of Illinois, Courts, Juvenile Courts (1899).

2 Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juve-

nile Cases, 1966 Sup. C.r. REv. 167.

3 Id.
4 Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966).
5 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909).

6 Insurance Co. v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435, 438 (1880).
7Id.

8Id.
" See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, §9-6 (1967).

Chapter 911/2 deals with
the power of the state to act on the person of the insane.
9 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91% (1967)

for statutory provisions dealing

with the power of the state to act on the person of the insane.

172

The John MarshallJournalof Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 2:171

to an institution for his protection.10 A sexual psychopath is
subject to confinement by the state without a criminal hearing.1
But it is with infants that the need for the state to be a protector is most apparent.
Legislative acts creating juvenile courts invariably contain
provisions for dealing with the dependent or neglected child 2 as
well as the delinquent child. The use of informal proceedings
when the court is dealing with a child who is without support,
or without parents or guardians to provide support, or who is
physically or mentally in need of assistance, would seem to be
3
clearly justified under the doctrine of parens patriae.1
As stated
by Judge Mack, "the state is the higher or ultimate parent of
all of the dependents within its borders."1 4 The state, when it
acts in parens patriae, is acting as the youngster's parent, whose
duty it is to provide care; and the youngster, it is reasoned, does
not require the protection of formal proceedings.
This same reasoning is applied to actions concerning both
dependent or neglected children and delinquent children. The
basic question that arises is whether such informality is condoned by the parens patriae doctrine when a child is faced with
the prospect of being adjudicated a delinquent and of being sent
to a state institution for delinquent children. Those critics who
opposed the court as conceived, level their objections at this feature. Dean Pound wrote, in 1937, that "[t]he powers of the
Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts. . . ."15 A more pointed attack on informality in juvenile proceedings was issued by the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement. Noting that one of the crucial presuppositions of the philosophy of the juvenile court was the availability
10

See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.

9

1%, §9-5 (1967).

"I See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 88, §105-3.01 (1967).
12 The original Illinois Act of 1899 provided for methods of dealing
with dependent or neglected children. Laws of Illinois, Courts, Juvenile
Courts §7 (1899). This function remains with the modern Illinois court.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§702-4, 702-5 (1967). The present statute, in section 702-4, defines a neglected child as any minor under 18 years of age,
who:
(a) . .. is neglected as to proper or necessary support, education
as required by law, or as to medical or other remedial care recognized
under State law or other care necessary for his well-being, or who is
abandoned by his parents, guardian or custodian; or
(b) whose environment is injurious to his welfare or whose
behavior is injurious to his own welfare or that of others.
A dependent minor is defined in section 702-5 as any minor under 18 years
of age, who:
(a) ...

is without a parent, guardian or legal custodian;

b) ... is without proper care because of the physical or mental
disability of his parent, guardian or custodian ....
13 Contra, Davidson, In re Gault: The Juvenile's Gideon, 56 ILL. BAR
J. 488, 498 (1968).
14 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909).
'1 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967)
citing POUND, Foreword to P.
YOUNG, SociAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY at xxvii (1937).
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of "a mature and sophisticated judge, wise and well versed in
law and the science of human behavior,'16 the Commission found
that:
A recent study of juvenile court judges in the United States revealed that half had no undergraduate degree; a fifth had received
no college education at all; a fifth were not members of the bar.
Almost three-quarters devote less than a quarter of their time to
juvenile and family matters, and judicial hearings often turn out
to be little more than attenuated interviews of 10 to 15 minutes'
duration.' 7
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGALITY OF THE JUVENILE COURT

The legality of the juvenile court remained unquestioned by
the Supreme Court of the United States until March 21, 1966,18
when the Court announced its decision in Kent V. United States.'

The case arose in the District of Columbia and, because it involved only the action of the United States, cannot be viewed as
having any direct application to the states.
In Kent, the defendant, at the age of fourteen, had been
placed in the custody of his mother, as a result of several housebreakings and a purse snatching. Approximately two years
later, when Kent was sixteen years old, a woman's apartment was
broken into, she was raped and her wallet was stolen. Kent's
fingerprints were found in the apartment and he was taken into
16 A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY ch. 3, at 80 (1967).

Id.
1"Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 167.
19 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Although the legality of the juvenile court was
not questioned in the Supreme Court of the United States until 67 years
after the first juvenile court had been created, it has been repeatedly questioned and upheld in state court decisions. See Paulsen, supra note 18, at
174-75.
"[0]ver forty state supreme courts have upheld the local
variants of such laws against the claim that the statutes violated both
state and federal constitutions in each case." Id. Professor Paulsen
cites the leading case of Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198
(1905), in which the court was faced with the contention that the proceedings in the juvenile court were criminal and, as such, that the child was
entitled to all the constitutional rights available to a defendant in a criminal
case. The court, in refuting this argument, said:
The design is not punishment, nor the restraint imprisonment, any
more than is the wholesome restraint which a parent exercises over his
17

child.

.

.

. Every statute which is designed to give protection, care...

and performance of parental duty, is but a recognition of the duty of the
state, as the legitimate guardian and protector of children where other
guardianship fails. No constitutional right is violated. .
Id. at 56-57, 62 A. at 201. In Illinois, in the early case of Witter v. Cook
County Comm'rs, 256 Ill. 616, 100 N.E. 148 (1912), a constitutional
attack on the juvenile court was met with similar language:
The parental care of the State is administered by the juvenile court,
and that court performs a purely judicial function. .

.

. The infant is

not brought before the court as a defendant charged with an infraction
of the laws, but is brought within the jurisdiction of the court to receive its care and protection.
Id. at 623, 100 N.E. at 150.
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Because of his age, Kent was subject

to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the juvenile court.20 However,
the juvenile court judge waived his jurisdiction to the criminal
court. 21 In the criminal court, Kent was convicted on six counts
of housebreaking and robbery and sentenced to serve 5 to 15
years on each count, or a total of 30 to 90 years in prison. On

appeal to the District Court of, Appeals, the judgment was affirmed.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court

of
of appeals on the grounds that the juvenile court's waiver
22
jurisdiction without a hearing constituted reversible error.
Allegations in the appeal which questioned the constitutionality of the operation of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court
were not answered, due to the reversal on the procedural error."
However, Justice Fortas, in writing the majority opinion, ad-

dressed himself to a general consideration of juvenile courts in
the United States:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious
questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough
against theoretical purposes to make tolerable the immunity of
the process from the reach of constitutional guaranties [sic] applicable to adults. There is much evidence that some juvenile courts

• ..lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity,
at least with respect to children charged with law violation. There
(1961), now §11-1551 (Supp. IV, 1965).
provisions for removal of causes from juvenile
to criminal court in Illinois are contained in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §702-7
(1967).
22 The Supreme Court agreed that the juvenile court judge had wide
discretion in determining when a cause could be removed to the criminal
court but found an abuse of that discretion in the instant case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute contemplates
that the Juvenile Court should have considerable latitude within which to
determine whether it should retain jurisdiction over a child or - subject to the statutory delimitation - should waive jurisdiction ...
At the outset, it assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and
fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement of a
'full investigation.'
D. C. CODE §11-907
21 Extensive statutory
20

383 U.S. at 552-53.
22 Other questions raised in Kent, were noted by the Court:

He [Kent] argues that petitioner's detention and interrogation
were unlawful. He contends that the police failed to follow the procedure prescribed by the Juvenile Court Act in that they failed to notify the parents of the child and the Juvenile Court itself . . . ; that

petitioner was deprived of his liberty for about a week without a determination of probable cause which would have been required in the
case of an adult . . . ; that he was interrogated by the police in the

absence of counsel or a parent [citation omitted], without warning
of his right to remain silent or advice as to his right to counsel, in
asserted violation of the Juvenile Court Act and in violation of rights
that he would have if he were an adult; and that petitioner was fingerprinted in violation of the asserted intent of the Juvenile Court Act and
while unlawfully detained and that the fingerprints were unlawfully
used in the District Court proceeding.
383 U.S. at 551.
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is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that

the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither
the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and re24
generative treatment postulated for children.
Slightly more than a year after its decision in Kent, the
Supreme Court, on May 15, 1967, announced its opinion in the
case of In re Gault.25 For the first time the Court addressed itself
to constitutional questions arising from a juvenile court proceeding.
In Gault, a verbal complaint had been made to the police
early in 1964, charging that Gerald Gault, a fifteen-year-old
Arizona boy, and two companions had made lewd or indecent
remarks to a Mrs. Cook. The police took Gerald into custody on
the morning of June 8, 1964. His mother arrived home from
work at about 6:00 P.M. and, not knowing the whereabouts of
her son, sent his older brother to look for him. Upon learning
from neighbors that Gerald was in the custody of the police, his
mother and brother went to the children's detention home where
they learned, from an Officer Flagg, the reason for Gerald's detention, and that there would be a hearing the next afternoon.
On June 9, 1964, the day of the hearing, Officer Flagg filed a
formal petition with the court, reciting only that Gerald Gault
was a delinquent minor in need of the court's protection. The
petition, however, was never served on the Gaults nor seen by
them until a subsequent habeas corpus hearing on August 17,
1964.26

At the hearing, Gerald, his mother and brother were present
with Gerald's companion and Officer Flagg. Mrs. Cook was not
present. No testimony under oath was taken, nor was any transcript or record made of the proceedings. After the hearing,
Gerald was returned to the detention home and was kept there
until June 11 or June 12, at which time he was released and
driven home. At 5:00 P.M. on the day of Gerald's release, Mrs.
Gault received a note on plain paper which read:
Mrs. Gault:
Judge McGHEE has set Monday June 15, 1964 at 11:00 A.M.
as the date and time for further Hearings on Gerald's delinquency 7
2
s/ Flagg

At this hearing there was further testimony as to the phone
conversation. Judge McGhee, testifying at the habeas corpus
24383 U.S. at 555-56.
For an extensive analysis of Kent see Paulsen,
Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Contest of Juvenile Cases, 1966
SuP. CT. REV. 167.
25387 U.S. 1 (1967).
26 The Supreme Court's knowledge of what occurred at the juvenile

court hearings was derived solely from this habeas corpus hearing.

No rec-

ord or transcript was taken at the hearings in juvenile court. Id. at 58.
27 Id.
at 6. It is not certain as to the exact date on which the note
was delivered and Gerald was released.
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hearing, recalled that "'there was some admission again of some
of the lewd statements. He - he didn't admit any of the more
serious lewd statements'. ' 28 Mrs. Gault's request that Mrs. Cook
be present was denied on the grounds that such presence was
not required. After the hearing and the filing of a referral
report by the probation officers, Judge McGhee rendered his
decision. At the time of the hearing, the Judge recalled a prior
referral report on Gerald in which it had been charged that he
had stolen a baseball glove and lied to the police about it. There
was no adjudication of this matter, "because of lack of material
foundation.' ' 29 In considering the prior report and the present
allegation, the judge concluded that Gerald was a delinquent
child pursuant to Arizona statute.30 Gerald was then committed
to the state industrial school "'for the period of his minority...
unless sooner discharged by due process of law'."' 1
Arizona did not provide any procedure for taking an appeal
from the juvenile court finding. As a result, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed in the Arizona Supreme Court. The matter was
sent to the Superior Court of Arizona for hearing, the superior
court dismissed the petition, and, after an appeal, the Supreme
Court of Arizona affirmed.32 Subsequently, an appeal was taken
to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. §1257(2).
At the outset the Court determined to limit itself to a consideration of six points:
1.

Notice of the charges;

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Right to counsel;
Right to confrontation and cross-examination;
Privilege against self-incrimination;
Right to a transcript of the
proceedings; and
33
Right to appellate review.
Addressing itself first to the traditional arguments upon
which proceedings in juvenile courts had been upheld against
constitutional attack in state courts, the Court observed that the
concept of the juvenile court as formulated by the early reformers was that:
The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child
8
Id. at 7. Judge McGhee testified to similar admissions having been
made at the first hearing.
29Id. at 9.
so ARIZ. REv. STAT. §8-201 (6) (d) (1955) which provides: "'Delinquent
child' includes ... (d) A child who habitually so deports himself as to injure
or endanger the morals or health of himself or others." Judge McGhee concluded that Gerald was a delinquent child habitually involved in immoral
matters.
31 387 U.S. at 7-8. Gerald Gault was thus faced with a possible six
years of confinement in the school for making vulgar and abusive phone
calls. If he had been an adult the maximum penalty he could have received
under Arizona law would have been a fifty dollar fine or two months imprisonment. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §13-377 (1955).
82 In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965).
The Court found it unnecessary to deal with points
88 387 U.S. at 10.
5 or 6 noted in the text.
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was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from
apprehension through4 institutionalization, were to be 'clinical'
rather than punitive.3

From this concept, noted the Court, flowed the traditional defense
to constitutional questions directed at the juvenile court:
These results were to be achieved, without coming to conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings
were not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens
patriae. ....
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child
procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the as-

sertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right 'not to liberty but
to custody.'35

In rejecting the parens patriae defense as an all-inclusive
justification for any act of a juvenile court, the Court observed
that the exercise of state power over the individual was subject
to the limitations imposed by the requirements of due process:
Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation
of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the
social compact which defines the rights of the 3 individual
and de6
limits the powers which the state may exercise.

The Court, in dealing with the specific issues raised in the
case before it, began its discussion with a consideration of notice.3 7 The only notice which the Gaults had received was: (a)
oral notice to Mrs. Gault on the evening of June 8, stating why
Gerald was in custody and informing her that there would be a
hearing the next afternoon; and (b) written notice consisting
of Officer Flagg's note, 8 on plain paper, that there would be a
hearing on Gerald's delinquency on June 15. This notice had
been held to satisfy the requirements of due process of law by
the Arizona Supreme Court,39 but the Supreme Court of the
United States disagreed. Holding that the notice to the Gaults
was not sufficient, the Court stated:
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given
sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must 'set
40
forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.

The Court next addressed itself to the constitutional question
of the necessity for advising a juvenile and his parents of the
right to counsel. 41 At no time were the Gaults advised that they
had a right to counsel. The Supreme Court of Arizona, noting
that there was disagreement among the various jurisdictions as
to whether an infant must be advised that he has a right to coun.4
35

38
3

Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16-17.

6 Id. at 20.

7 Id. at 31.
38 See text at note 27 supra.

89 In 'e Gault 99 Ariz. 181, 190, 407 P.2d 760, 767 (1965).
40 387 U.S. at 33.
41 Id.
at 34.
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sel, had rejected the argument that due process required that the
youngster be advised of such right, and held that the infant's
interest was protected by his parents and the probation officer.
The Supreme Court did not agree and concluded that:
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency
which may result in commitment to an institution in which the
juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be
notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained
by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will
2
be appointed to represent the child.4
The Arizona Supreme Court had held that Gerald was not
deprived of his constitutional rights by the failure of the juvenile
court to advise him of his privilege to remain silent4 3 and of his

right to confront his accuser. 4 On both points the Supreme Court
of the United States disagreed. 45 Again emphasizing that it was
here concerned "only with a proceeding to determine whether a
minor is a 'delinquent' and which may result in commitment to

a state institution,"'

6

the Court upheld Gault's privilege against

self-incrimination and stated:
It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against selfincrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to
children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to
the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception. And the scope of the privilege is
47
comprehensive.
Id. at 41.
The Arizona Supreme Court in holding that there was constitutional
irregularity in the failure to advise Gault of his right to remain silent,
resorted to the traditional argument, stating that "the necessary flexibility
for individualized treatment will be enhanced by a rule which does not require the judge to advise the infant of a privilege against self-incrimination."
In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 191, 407 P.2d 760, 767-68 (1965).
44 The Arizona Court, in denying that Gault had the right to crossexamination and confrontation, said:
IT]he sounder rule allows the judge to consider hearsay though the
hearing is contested. . . . But the hearsay upon which the judge can
rely must be of a kind on which reasonable men are accustomed to rely
in serious affairs.
Id. at 192, 407 P.2d at 768.
45 387 U.S. at 42.
46 Id. at 44.
47 Id. at 47. The Court, citing from Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 94 (1963), further stated:
The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding be it criminal or
civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory . . . it
protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend
could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used. (emphasis the Court's).
387 U.S. at 47-48. In deciding the issue of self-incrimination, the Court also
looked to the case of Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), in which a fifteen
year-old boy had been convicted of murder in criminal court. A confession
which had been admitted into evidence was the basis of reversal. Justice
Douglas pointed out that special precautions are required when a confession
is taken of a child: "Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process
of law." Id. at 601.
42

43
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Although the Court recognized that the privilege against
self-incrimination, as applicable to a juvenile proceeding, gave

rise to special problems as to waiver,' 8 its general position remained unequivocal, and the Court concluded "that the consti-

in the
tutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable
4 9
adults.1
to
respect
with
is
it
as
case of juveniles
In holding that Gault should have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine his accuser, the Supreme Court pointed
out that:
[A]bsent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency
and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with our law and constitutional requirements.5"

The issues dealing with appellate review and transcript of
proceedings were not decided in Gault, since reversal could be
based on errors which had already been determined. Nevertheless, the Court went on to note the need for an appellate proceeding in cases involving juveniles:
As the present case illustrates, the consequences of failure to
provide an appeal, to record the proceedings, or to make findings
or state the grounds for the juvenile court's conclusion may be to
throw a burden upon the machinery for habeas corpus, to saddle
the reviewing process with the burden of attempting to reconstruct a record, and to impose upon the Juvenile Judge the unseemly duty of testifying under cross-examination as to the events
that transpired in the hearings before him. 51

In conclusion, Gault stood for certain comparatively limited
principles. In a juvenile hearing, in which a determination of
delinquency is at issue, and a youngster is faced with a possibility of confinement in a state institution, there exists: (1) a
right to sufficient notice to prepare for the hearing 52 ; (2) a necessity that the youngster be advised of his right to counsel 53 ; (3)
a privilege against self-incrimination 54 ; and (4) a right to cross55
examine witnesses and confront the accuser.
48 387 U.S. at 55. The Court stated:
We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver
of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be
some differences in technique - but not in principle - depending
upon the age of the child and the presence and competence of parents. . . . If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when
an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure
that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not
coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance
of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.
Id.
4

Id.

50 Id. at 57.

51 Id.at 58.
See
53 See
54 See
55 See
52

text
text
text
text

at note 40 supra.
at note 42 supra.
at note 47 supra.
at note 50 supra.
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The Gault decision may have a more profound effect on
future proceedings in juvenile courts of the United States than
will the specific issues decided therein. The doctrine of parens
patriae can no longer be considered the unassailable protector of
informal proceedings in juvenile courts. 56 The argument that proceedings in juvenile court are "civil" and not "criminal," thereby
making constitutional protections found in the criminal law inapplicable, will no longer shield the juvenile courts from constitutional attack.57 Most significantly, it is now clear that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment is a limitation on
proceedings in juvenile courts, and that the court's proceedings
must adhere to the requirements of fundamental fairness which
5 8
are the dictates of the due process clause.
PRESENT ILLINOIS COURT

On January 1, 1966, a new Juvenile Court Act was adopted
in Illinois.5 9 This Act should be examined in the light of the
Gault decision to determine if it adheres to the constitutional
requirements announced in that case.
0 reThe purpose and policy of the Act, as stated therein,1
main consistent with the aims of the early founders of the juvenile court system. The Act, however, goes substantially further
56 "IT]he

Juvenile Court Judge's exercise of the power of the state

as parens patriae ...

[is] not unlimited."

387 U.S. at 30.

Under the doctrine of parens patriae it was originally felt that because the state was acting to protect the child and not to punish him the
proceedings were civil and not criminal. See note 19 supra.
58 This does not mean that the limits of due process, as defined in
criminal constitutional cases, are superimposed on the juvenile courts. As
Justice Fortas said in Gault:
57

'We do not mean .

.

. to indicate that the hearing to be held must con-

form with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even the usual
administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure
up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.'
387 U.S. at 30.
59 IL.. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§701-1 - 708-4 (1967). (Juvenile Court Act).
60
Id. §701-2:
(1) The purpose of this Act is to secure for each minor subject
hereto such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve
the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the
best interest of the community; to preserve and strengthen the minor's
family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his
parents only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public
cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and, when the
minor is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody, care
and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should be
given by his parents, and in cases where it should and can properly
be done to place the minor in a family home so that he may become a
member of the family by legal adoption or otherwise.

(2)

. . . This

Act shall be administered in a spirit of humane concern, not only for
the rights of the parties, but also for the fears and the limits of understanding of all who appear before the court.
Ironically no similar provision was found in the original act, Laws of
Illinois, Courts, Juvenile Courts (1899), even though these were the very
ideas which motivated its passage.
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in providing the process by which the juvenile court is to function.
The objections that the Supreme Court voiced to the Arizona
proceeding in Gault are all but non-existent in the Illinois Act.
Section 701-20 states the rights of the parties in the proceedings,
which include:
(1) Except as provided in this Section and paragraph (2) of
Section 5-1,61 the minor who is the subject of the proceeding and his
parents, guardian, legal custodian or responsible relative who are
parties respondent have the right to be present, to be heard, to
present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine
witnesses, to examine pertinent court files and records and also,
although proceedings under this Act are not intended to be adversary in character, the right to be represented by counsel ...
(3) At the first appearance before the court by the minor,
his parents, guardian, custodian or responsible relative, the court
shall explain the nature of the proceedings and inform the parties
of their rights under the first 2 paragraphs of this Section ....
(4) No sanction may be applied against the minor who is
the subject of the proceedings by reason of his refusal or failure to
testify in the course of any hearing held prior to final adjudication
under Section 4-8.62
It is clear from sections (1) and (3) that the necessity for
advising the minor or those responsible for him of the right to
counsel,63 and the right to cross-examine witnesses, is recognized
by the Act, and, as such, satisfies the dictates of Gault. The
privilege against self-incrimination contained in section (4),
however, falls short of the requirement set forth in Gault. First,
it should be noted that section (4) is not controlled by section
(3) ; thus, the Act does not provide that the youngster be advised
of his privilege not to testify against himself, 64 nor does the privilege against self-incrimination, as provided in the Act, extend to
the adjudicatory hearings. Under Gault, a finding of delinquency
based on an admission by a minor who has not been advised of
his privilege against self-incrimination, would be unconstituThis section deals with the
61 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §705-1 (1967).
dispositional hearing and permits the court to make certain departures from
the procedural limitations of §701-20. After the minor is adjudicated a
ward of the court, the juvenile judge may hear any evidence which would
not have been admissible at the adjudicatory hearing, but is admonished to
consider such evidence only to the extent of its probative value. The court
is permitted to refuse disclosure to the parties of reports prepared for the

court's use.
62

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §701-20 (1967).

63 The Act provides that the fact that the parties have a right to
counsel shall be noted on the summons. Id. §704-3(2).
64 A suggestion had been made that the Act include a requirement that
the juvenile court judge inform the minor of his right to remain silent.
This suggestion was rejected as being inconsistent with the philosophy of
the juvenile court in that it would hinder the full cooperation desired in the
court. Trumbull, Proposed New Juvenile Court Act for Illinois, 53 ILL.
BAR. J. 608, 617 (1965).

182

The John MarshallJournalof Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 2:171

tional. 6 5 If a court, following the Illinois Act, fails to inform a
minor of his privilege against self-incrimination, it would seem
that a finding of delinquency could be reversed.
One of the major objections of the Supreme Court in Gault
was the failure of Arizona to provide a juvenile and his parents
with adequate notice.6 6 No similar objection can be raised to
the Illinois Act. Article 467 of the Act provides that a verified
petition must be filed with the court and that the petition must
contain facts sufficient to bring the minor within the requirements of section 702-1.68 A copy of this petition must be attached to the summons which is issued to the parties. Thus, the
parties are notified from the outset of the facts upon which the
issue of delinquency will be decided.
The Act provides for personal service of summons on both
the minor and his parents or guardians. 69 Substituted service is
permitted by certified mail if personal service cannot be made,
70
or if it appears that any respondent lives outside the state.
Service may also be made by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the action is pending, 7' but
such publication may be utilized only in the event that service
cannot be had by certified mail.7 2 Service by certified mail and
by publication are available only for respondents named in the
73
petitions and are not available for the minor.
In Gault, the Supreme Court objected to the notice requirement in Arizona, not only because it failed to give the parties
adequate information about the nature of the action, but also
because it failed to give the parties sufficient time to prepare for
a hearing.74 The Illinois Act provides for a specific minimum
time which must be allowed the parties after service of summons.
Where personal service is made, such service must be had at
75
least three days prior to the date set for the parties' appearance.
If notice is by certified mail the adjudicatory hearing cannot proSee text at notes 47 and 49 supra.
See text at note 40 supra.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§704-1 - 704-8 (1967).
Id. §704-1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §702-1 (1967), provides for jurisdictional facts required to bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. It reads:
Proceedings may be instituted under the provisions of this Act concerning boys and girls who are delinquent, otherwise in need of supervision,
65
66
67
68

neglected or dependent, as denied in Sections 2-2 through 2-5.
69 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §704-3 (1967).

701d.
71ild.
72 Id.
73 Id.

§704-4(1).
§704-4(2).
§704-4 (4).
§704-4. The sections of the statute refer only to respondents.

Section 704-3, dealing with personal service, differentiates between the
minor and the respondents.
74 See text at note 40 supra.
75

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §704-3(5)

(1967).
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ceed until five days after mailing of the notice,76 and in the event77
days.
of notice by publication, the court may not proceed for ten
8
Liberal provisions for continuances are also provided.7
The time given to a party to prepare under the Illinois Act
should be considered in view of other provisions of the Act. The
date for the adjudicatory hearing must be set within 30 days of
the filing of the petition.79 If the child is being detained the
hearing must be set within ten days of the filing of the petition. 0
The Illinois Act thus recognizes that while it is essential that a
party be given sufficient time to prepare for the hearing, it is
equally essential that the hearing take place as soon as possible.
A method of appeal8 ' is also provided in the Act, and a
transcript of record may be made as in any other judicial proceeding.
With the exception of the provision involving the privilege
against self-incrimination, the Illinois Act is in accord with
specific holdings in the Gault decision; however, the Gault decision did more than decide specific issues.
The philosophy set forth in Gault cannot be viewed as limited to the specific issues decided in that case. It is reasonable
to expect that future opinions of the Court will further develop
considerations of due process in juvenile court proceedings. Although the Illinois Act substantially adheres to the specific holdings of Gault, the Act must also be examined with an awareness
82
of the probable result of future Supreme Court opinions.
The decision in Gault dealt only with the right of an accused
juvenile at an adjudicatory hearing; his position prior to this
final hearing has yet to be decided. The crucial requirement that
76
77

78

79
80

§704-4(1).
Id. §704-4(3).
Id. §704-7.
Id. §704-2.
Id.

Id.

81 Id.

82 In the recent case of In re Whittington, 36 U.S.L.W. 4466 (U.S. May
20, 1968) (No. 701), the Supreme Court, in an appeal from a decision of
the Ohio Court of Appeals, 13 Ohio App. 2d 11, 233 N.E.2d 333 (1967), upholding certain proceedings of an Ohio juvenile court, was presented with
the following questions:
(1) Does finding of delinquency in juvenile court hearing, based only
upon preponderance of evidence, violate Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause? (2) Does Ohio Juvenile Code, in permitting judge
to receive evidence in absence of accused child and his counsel prior to
hearing, and failing to provide for jury trial, violate Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? (3) Were accused child's right to
counsel and privilege against self-incrimination abridged by admission, in juvenile court proceedings, of statements taken from him during custodial interrogation by police who did not warn him of right to
counsel or privilege against self-incrimination?
36 U.S.L.W. 3192 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1967) (No. 701). The Supreme Court, however, chose not to answer these questions at this time, vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the Ohio Court of Appeals of Fairfield
County for consideration in the light of Gault. 36 U.S.L.W. at 4467.
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an accused be advised of the right to counsel and the privilege
against self-incrimination during the investigatory period, available to adult defendants in criminal cases, may well be determined
to be equally applicable to a juvenile proceeding. Section 701-20
(3) of the Act 5 directs the court to inform the parties of the
right to counsel at the time of the first appearance before the
court. If it is decided that the requirement that the youngster
be advised of his right to counsel attaches when he is first detained by an officer, the provision of the Act would not be sufficient. However, this does not seem to present too difficult a
problem, since judicial decision could direct that officers advise
juveniles of the right to counsel, without upsetting the less demanding requirement of the Act. As noted previously, 84 the
privilege against self-incrimination provided in the Illinois Act,
falls short of the requirement of the Gault decision in that a
youngster need not be advised of his privilege. This failure can
be corrected by judicial decision, and if the need arises to extend
the privilege to the time of initial detention, judicial direction
should likewise be adequate.
The Illinois Act is not silent regarding the procedures required prior to the adjudicatory hearing. Article 385 of the Act
relates generally to the early stages of the proceedings. First,
a juvenile may be taken into custody by a police officer without
a warrant.8 In the event of a youngster being taken into custody in this manner, the police officer must immediately attempt
to notify the parent or guardian of the child, and must also
either surrender the minor to the nearest juvenile police officer
designated for such purpose in the county of venue, or to a juvenile police officer in the city or village where the offense allegedly was committed.8
A minor may also be taken into custody
when a petition has been filed pursuant to section 704-1,18 and
the court finds cause to detain him at that time.8 9
Once the minor is in the custody of juvenile officers he must
be brought before a judicial officer for the purpose of a detention
hearing within 48 hours, unless released sooner.90 If this procedure is not followed, the juvenile must be released. 9 1 At the
detention hearing, the court is required to hear evidence to deILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §701-20(1) (1967). See text at note 62 sup'a.
See text at notes 64-65 supra.
85 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§703-1-703-8 (1967).
861d. §703-1(1).
88 Id. §703-1 2).
The fact that a minor is taken into custody prior to
the filing of a petition does not dispense with the need for a petition, and
thus, a summons, to the parties providing notice for the adjudicatory hearing. The petition can be prepared and filed by the juvenile officials. Id.
§703-5(2).
89 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §703-1(2)
(1967).
o Id. §703-5(1).
9
1Id. §703-5(3).
83
84
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termine if there is probable cause to believe the minor is a delinquent minor.9 2 If probable cause is not found, the juvenile must
be released and the petition discharged. 3 Notice of the detention hearing to the parents, guardians, or counsel of the minor
may be oral,94 but if there is not actual notice the matter may be
set for rehearing.

5

In addition, the rights of the parties, as provided for in
section 701-20, are as effective at these early stages of the proceedings as they are at the adjudicatory hearing.96 The provisions relating to initial proceedings under the Illinois Act are in
keeping with the philosophy of Gault that fundamental fairness
be provided to the minor before the juvenile court, and it is unlikely that these proceedings will be substantially affected by
future Supreme Court decisions.
The Illinois Act protects certain rights of the parties to a
juvenile hearing which are not mentioned in Gault. Specifically,
these rights include the right to be present at the proceedings,
the right to be heard, and the right to examine pertinent court
files and records.97 Questions concerning the constitutional
availability of these rights are questions which lend themselves
to judicial decision in the United States Supreme Court.98 If
and when it is decided that due process requires that these rights
are available to the parties in a juvenile hearing, the Illinois Act
will be unaffected by the Court's affirmance of the Act's provisions.
The only procedural safeguard provided in the original Illinois Act of 1899 was the right to trial by jury.9 Ironically, no
such provision is found in the present Act. The question of the
right to a jury trial in a juvenile hearing was recently presented
to the Supreme Court in the case of In re Wittington,100 but the
Court did not directly decide this or the other constitutional issues raised.'101 If such decision is reached, Illinois will be compelled to provide for a jury in juvenile hearings. This will best
be done by amending the Act.
Another aspect of procedural safeguards to be furnished in
juvenile courts is the quantum of proof required at the adjudicatory hearing. In In re Wittington,102 the Supreme Court was
92

Id. §703-6.

93 Id. §703-6(l)
94 Id. §703-5 (2).

95 Id. §703-6 (3).
98 Id §701-20.

See text at note 62 supra.
§701-20(1).
98 The right to be present prior to an adjudicatory hearing was a question recently before the Supreme Court. See authority cited note 82 supra.
99 Laws of Illinois, Courts, Juvenile Courts, §2 (1899).
100 36 U.S.L.W. 4466 (U.S. May 20, 1968) (No. 701).
101 See authority cited note 82 supra.
102 36 U.S.L.W. 4466 (U.S. May 20, 1968) (No. 701).
97 Id.
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faced with the question of whether a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to support a finding of delinquency, but the
Court did not decide the issue. 10 3 The Illinois Act provides that
the rules of evidence applicable to civil proceedings (i.e. a preponderance of the evidence) shall be used in adjudicatory hearings. 0 4 The Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of In re Urbasek,'1° decided that, in view of the Gault decision, it was improper
for the quantum of proof in a delinquency proceeding to be that
quantum used in civil cases. Rather, the burden of proof required
in criminal cases (i.e. beyond a reasonable doubt) was declared
to be applicable in Illinois delinquency hearings.
The court was not compelled by the specific holdings of
Gault to make the decision it did in Urbasek, but, as stated by
the Court:
[T]he language of that opinion exhibits a spirit that transcends
the specific issues there involved, and ... in view thereof, it

would not be consonant with due process or equal protection to
grant allegedly delinquent juveniles the same procedural rights
that protect adults charged with crimes, while depriving these
rights of their full efficacy by allowing a finding of delinquency
upon a lesser standard of proof than that required to sustain a
criminal conviction. 06
At this point it should be emphasized that the Gault decision
does not superimpose the procedural requirements of a criminal
trial on juvenile hearings. Justice Fortas, in the Gault decision,
noted:
'We do not mean ... to indicate that the hearing to be held must
conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of
the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing
must measure
up to the essentials of due process and fair treat0

ment."l

T

It seems unavoidable, however, that courts will look to the standards of fairness found to be applicable in criminal cases when
determining the standards to be used in a juvenile proceeding.
In the case of In re Orr,0 1 an adjudged delinquent sought to
raise questions relating to the effect of Gault upon proceedings
under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. The respondent contended
that the rules formulated in Miranda v. Arizona, °9 relating to
confessions, and the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding bail in criminal cases, are applicable to delinquency proceedings. The court avoided answering the respondent's conten103

See authority cited note 82 supra.

104 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §704-6 (1967).
105

38 Ii1.2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).

106 Id. at 541-42, 232 N.E.2d at 719.
107 387 U.S. at 30, citing Kent v. United States,
108 38 IlI.2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 424 (1967).
109 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
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tion, holding that the Miranda standards had not been violated, 110
and that the court was not required to determine if the Miranda
rules were applicable to a delinquency proceeding.

The fact is,

however, that the court did apply Miranda,and it is reasonable
to speculate that if a violation had been found, the court would
have reversed the finding of the juvenile court. The court did
not answer the question as to bail because the question had become moot.
The Urbasek and Orr cases are not to be interpreted as
standing for the proposition that the juvenile court is in reality
a criminal court requiring the application of certain pre-defined
rules of procedure. What the court does assert in these two
cases, is that the philosophy of the Gault decision requires that
a minor be given a fair hearing. To determine the proper standards of fairness, reliance may be placed on constitutional rules
formulated in the field of criminal law, but these need not be
controlling.: 1' It may be that, in the final analysis, the due
process standards which are eventually formulated by the juvenile court will coincide with the standards found in the criminal
law. This result, if achieved, should be accomplished by a caseby-case approach, in which the court has the opportunity to examine specific facts and decide specific issues.
When the Illinois Act is examined to determine whether it
adheres to possible future constitutional pronouncements of the
Supreme Court, the emphasis should be on a determination of
fundamental fairness within the context of the juvenile court.
Viewed in this manner, the Illinois Act, in section 701-20, and in
its provisions for notice, provides for procedural safeguards
which should substantially satisfy the constitutional command
that a youngster in a juvenile court proceeding be assured due
process of law.
CONCLUSION

A revolution has taken place in juvenile court proceedings.
The Gault decision demands that juvenile court proceedings
throughout the country be reorganized. As stated by Justice
:10The court held that Orr's confession was a spontaneous statement
and, as a result, the failure of the arresting police officer to warn him of his
right to remain silent did not invalidate the confession. 38 Ill.2d at 423-24,
231 N.E.2d at 427-28.
111 Juvenile court differs from criminal court. Its primary object,
that of aiding the youthful offender, remains, even though juvenile courts
have so often failed in this function. The solution is not to abandon this
aim, because it is so hard to attain, but rather to attempt to improve the
court. It is the position of the Court in Gault that the object of rehabilitation is aided, not frustrated by the proper application of due process of law.
The Court stated that "'(u]nless appropriate due process of law is followed, even the juvenife who has violated the law may not feel that he is
being fairly treated and may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of
court personnel.'" 387 U.S. at 26.
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Fortas in Gault, "[u]nder our Constitution the condition of being
a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."" i2 The Illinois lawyer
is in the fortunate position of having a Juvenile Court Act which
substantially adheres to the holdings and philosophy of Gault.
The stature of the Illinois Act became apparent when Justice
Underwood wrote in Urbasek: "the Illinois statutory scheme
... could well act as a model among the States for protecting the
rights of juvenile court defendants." 113
Thomas R. Fitzgerald

112
113

387 U.S. at 28.
38 Ill.2d at 542, 232 N.E.2d at 720.

